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COMMENT
The Erosion of Probable Cause
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the Supreme Court's holding in Terry v. Ohio I that less than
probable cause is permissible to stop and frisk an individual created a
marked exception to the absolute fourth amendment2 requirement that
probable cause3 must accompany all searches and seizures. This new
exception to the probable cause requirement generally has been called
the "reasonable suspicion" standard.4 Although the Terry Court in-
tended its holding to be narrowly interpreted5 and applied only in dan-
gerous law enforcement situations,6 it has been expanded to many
areas where there is little, if any, danger to law enforcement officials.
Indeed, the Terry standard has been invoked under circumstances in-
volving aggressive law enforcement practices where there has been an
absence of probable cause to justify search and seizure.' This erosion
I. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and affects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
3. For a discussion of probable cause, see notes 12-62, infra and accompanying text.
4. The term "reasonable suspicion" was never expressly stated by Chief Justice Warren in
Terry. In a companion case to Terry, however, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), reason-
able suspicion was articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan. He stated: "Under
. . . Terry a right to stop may indeed be premised on reasonable suspicion and does not require
probable cause." Id. at 71. (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Douglas also used
the phrase in his Terry dissent, where he stated: "The term 'probable cause' rings a bell of cer-
tainty that is not sounded by phrases such as 'reasonable suspicion.'" 392 U.S. 1, 37 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
"Founded suspicion" has been used interchangeably with "reasonable suspicion" by some
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez-Villalobos, 500 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1974); Wilson v.
Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). See Landynski, The Supreme Court's Searchfor Fourth
Amendment Standards: The Problem of Stop and Frisk, 45 CONN. B.J. 146, 181 n.i 15 (1971);
Morris, Search and Seizure, Border Area Stops, 4 Am. J. CIuM. L. 203, 212, n.41 (1975-1976).
5. The Court stated:
[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable searchfor weapons for the
protection ofthepolice officer, where he had reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause...
392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
6. Id
7. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (stop and subsequent search
of suspected drug courier based on a profile of drug couriers), discussed infra at notes 223-239 and
accompanying text; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (investigatory stop of a
1
Unger: The Erosion of Probable Cause
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1982
EROSION OF PROBABLE CA USE
of probable cause has effectively diluted the traditional fourth amend-
ment protections embodied in the probable cause standard' and threat-
ens ultimately to eliminate the probable cause requirement, thereby
"eviscerating [the] fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures."9
In tracing the development of the Terry reasonable suspicion stan-
dard, this article will discuss the probable cause requirement prior to
Terry, the Terry v. Ohio decision itself, and the extension of reasonable
suspicion to select areas of the law. t° The thesis of this article is that
the probable cause standard has been greatly diluted by the Supreme
Court and is being replaced slowly by the reasonable suspicion excep-
tion. The expansion of this new standard is consonant with the Burger
Court's antipathy toward the exclusionary rulet I and its attempts to cir-
cumvent the rule by lowering the overall standards for constitutional
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
The Fourth Amendment was designed to insure that individuals and
their property will not be subjected to unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Amendment was a reaction to the oppressive writs of
vehicle without probable cause because occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry), discussed
infra at notes 130-145 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the historical roots of the probable cause standard, see Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-102 (1958), and notes 29-44 infra and accompanying text.
9. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Except for a brief discussion of administrative searches, this comment will not specifically
address the dilution of probable cause in situations requiring a warrant for a reasonable search
and seizure.
!1. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975). In Stone, Chief Justice Burger, concurring,
noted: "[I]t seems clear to me that the exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to
demonstrate its flaws. The time has come to modify its reach, even if it is retained for a small and
limited category of cases." Id at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
The exclusionary rule enforces the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It was adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where the
Court held that any evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible in
federal court. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule was applied to states through the four-
teenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 443-44 (1949); Wolf v. Colorado, 335 U.S. 25 (1959); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1959); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949). The judicial basis for the exclusionary
rule is its successful tendency to deter police misconduct. See generally United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); LaFave, Impro'ing Police
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part Two--Dfning the Norms and Training the Po-
lice, 30 Mo. L. REV. 566 (1965); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52
J. CRim. L.C.S. 255 (1961).
12. See supra note 2 for the text of the fourth amendment. The prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures is considered one of the most essential constitutional guarantees of
liberty and personal security. Mr. Justice Bradley stated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1885), that the Amendment shall
[aIpply to all invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors. . . that constitutes. . . the offence; but it is the invasion. . . of his
2
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assistance 13 the British used to indiscriminately search for colonist vio-
lations of British tax laws.14 The writ, as well as the general arrest war-
rant, which left blank the name of the person to be arrested, both
perpetuated the abusive police practice of arresting and searching any
individual on a mere suspicion. 5 Consequently, in early searches and
seizures, "police control took the place of judicial control since no
showing of probable cause before a magistrate was required." 6 In or-
der to avoid the oppressive search and seizure policies that existed prior
to the American Revolution, the Framers of the Bill of Rights enacted
indefensible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property. it is the
invasion of [a] sacred right.
13. Writs of assistance were general search warrants, which were adopted under the 1662 Act
of Charles I1, 13 and 14 Char. II, ch. 11, sec. 5. The 1662 Act was an attempt to strictly enforce the
British trade laws. It authorized the Court of Exchequer to issue a broad warrant for the search of
any house, shop, warehouse, and, if necessary, break open doors, chests, and packages. Lasson,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES at 43-
52 [hereinafter cited as LASSON]. See generally Gray, Quincy's Reports of Massachusetts Bay,
1761-1772, Appendix I, pp. 395-540.
14. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1964); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629
(1885). In America, writs of assistance generally were abused. Once issued, the writ was not
returnable after execution and was good as a continuing license. Thus, the discretion delegated to
the official was almost absolute and unlimited. The strongest resistance to the writs was in Massa-
chusetts, where the Governor issued them excessively. They were used as general search warrants
which enabled the police to search randomly for contraband. The writs were later one of the first
areas of colonist opposition against England's whole policy in the American colonies and, there-
fore, were one of the leading causes of the American Revolution. LASSON, supra note 13, at 54-59.
The writs were denounced by James Otis "as the worst instrument of arbitrary power... because
they placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer!' " 379 U.S. at 481 (quot-
ing Tudor, LIFE OF JAMES OTIS, 66 (1823)).
15. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
16. Id Probable cause is a general prerequisite to the issuance of arrest and search warrants
by a magistrate. The warrant requirement generally is considered the cornerstone of the Fourth
Amendment. Indeed, one commentator reports that the Amendment was "a one-barreled affair,
directed apparently only to the essentials of a valid warrant." LASSON, supra note 13, at 103.
The major purpose of the warrant requirement was articulated by the Court in McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. . . . [It] interpose[s] a magistrate
between the citizen and the police. . . [The warrant requirement] was done so that an objec-
tive mind might weigh the need to invade. . . privacy in order to enforce the law.
Id at 455-56.
Moreover, warrantless searches and seizures are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
The basic requirements of a valid warrant under the fourth amendment include:
I) A probable cause showing supported by oath or affirmation that the particular person or
thing can be found in the place to be searched;
2) A specific place to be searched, particularly described;
3) The specific things to be seized or the person to be arrested;
4) All of the above must be reviewed by a magistrate who decides whether to issue the war-
rant.
See Note, Recent Fourth Amendment Developments, 29 OHIO STATE L.J. 217, 222 (1968). Other
factors that a magistrate can consider are the nature and number of items to be seized, the time of
the search, the place to be searched, and whether an arrest is a pretext for a search. Id at 219,
n.16.
3
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the Fourth Amendment, which required a showing of probable cause
before a search and seizure could take place.' 7 Therefore, because the
fourth amendment "has roots that are deep in our history,"' 8 early
American case law stressed the paramount importance of the probable-
cause requirement. 9 In fact, in some situations a "strong suspicion to
suspect" was even inadequate to support a warrant.20
The traditional approach to defining the probable cause requirement
was expressed in probabilities. 2' The Supreme Court has defined prob-
able cause as "reasonable grounds for belief of guilt [which is] . . . less
than evidence which would justify condemnation or conviction. ' 22 It is
a standard, however, that requires "more than bare suspicion." 23 This
simplistic formula of early probable cause was predicated on the belief
that law enforcement officials may not initiate a search unless they have
a reasonable belief that contraband is present. 2' However, a "mere be-
lief or suspicion is generally not enough to furnish probable cause un-
less the officer can point to specific facts or circumstances [observed by
or] presented to him."' 25  Furthermore, probable cause is an objective
standard.26 The reasonable man test cited most often by courts to de-
termine probable cause was first articulated in Carroll v. United
States27 where the Court stated that probable cause exists when "the
facts and circumstances within the . . [officer's knowledge] are suffi-
17. The probable cause requirement is stated in note 2, supra.
18. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 160 (1959). See generally Armentano, The Standards
for Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN. L.J. 137 (1970).
19. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 101. Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(warrantless seizure of private papers found outside of defendant's premises unconstitutional);
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878) (warrant required for seizures by Internal Revenue agents); In
re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (warrant required to seize mail). Contra Murray v. Hoboken Land
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) (warrant requirement not applicable to the recovery of debts).
20. E.g., Grumon v. Raymond, I Conn. 39 (1814); Conner v. Commonwealth (Pa.), 3 Binn 38
(1802).
21. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948). See Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Bacigel, Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L. FORUM 763, 768
n.26 (1979).
22. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175. See Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
23. 338 U.S. at 175. One commentator stated that the only certain assertion of probable
cause is that it "lies somewhere between bare suspicion and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Armento, supra note 18, at 144.
24. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 99-102 (1959); See Bacigel, supra note 21, at
767-68.
25. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (Court held that there was no prob-
able cause to issue a search warrant based on affidavits of suspicion).
26. 361 U.S. at 102; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 642 (1878). Although generally considered
an objective standard, many commentators believe probable cause to be "ultimately subjectively
derived." See Bacigel, supra note 21; Leslie, The Graduation of Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the
Context of Street Detentions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1977).
27. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Court upheld warrantless search of vehicle with probable cause).
Other cases in which the Court employed this objective test include Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
4
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cient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that" 28 an offense has been or is being committed.
Although the fourth amendment has resulted in more litigation than
any other provision of the Bill of Rights, 29 the Supreme Court has con-
sidered the probable cause requirement in a relatively small number of
cases;30 consequently, the probable cause issue always has been a very
unsettled area of jurisprudence.3 Under the traditional approach to
probable cause disputes, the Court conducted a factual inquiry by us-
ing the police officer's version of the facts that gave rise to the dispute
at bar.' 2 The Court then focused on the factual likelihood that a seiza-
ble item was present and, finally, determined whether probable cause
existed to sustain a seizure. 3 Because the Supreme Court essentially
has avoided clarifying the amount of evidence and the degree of cer-
tainty required to satisfy this vague constitutional standard, it has re-
mained a confusingly flexible requirement.34  Accordingly, the
determination of whether there is probable cause to sustain a search 35
and seizure36 can only be made through a case-by-case analysis.
Despite its ambiguity, the probable cause standard has effectively
protected individuals against invasion of privacy and unfounded crimi-
nal charges while affording society sufficient law enforcement protec-
28. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 162. See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at
102.
29. Landynski, supra note 4, at 454.
30. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 70, 74 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
stated that Sibron was "the latest in an exceedingly small number of cases in this Court indicating
what suffices for probable cause."
31. Bacigel, supra note 21, at 771. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 301, 313 (1959).
32. Bacigel, supra note 21, at 771. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949),
Justice Jackson suggested that the Court create a sliding scale for probable cause according to the
offense committed. One commentator has indicated that the Court lowered the probable cause
standard after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), to give state law enforcement officials time to
cope with the exclusionary rule. Note, Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, 25 OHIO ST. L.J.
505, 512 (1964).
33. Bacigel, supra note 21, at 771. The same probable cause analysis and standards also
apply to arrests which, for fourth amendment purposes, generally are considered seizures. This
notion that identical fourth amendment standards should apply to seizure of contraband as well
as to the seizure of an individual was stated by Justice Powell, concurring in United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1975):
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and since an
arrest, the taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the
constitutional provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it does upon
searches. . . . Logic. . . dictate[s] that arrests be subject to the warrant requirement at least
to the same extent as searches.
Id at 428-29 (Powell, J., concurring).
34. Bacigel, supra note 2 1, at 771.
35. "Search" is defined as an essentially unlimited examination of a person or his/her abode
or business for any and all seizable items. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 17-18 n.15 (1968).
36. "Seizure" is considered the restraint of freedom or movement by means of physical force
or a show of authority. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
5
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tion.37 The utility of the probable cause requirement was probably best
articulated in Brinegar v. United States,38 where the Court stated:
The role of probable cause is a practical, non-technical conception af-
fording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating
these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper
law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens
at the mercy of officers' whim or caprice.
Furthermore, under the traditional approach, probable cause constitu-
tionally is required in three situations: 1) an arrest and incidental
search without a warrant; 2) to issue a search warrant; 3) to issue an
arrest warrant.39 Moreover, searches and seizures conducted without a
warrant are almost always suspect because they lack judicial review of
the necessary probable cause.' These situations, not surprisingly, have
given the Court the most difficulty.'
When deciding whether there is probable cause to sustain a search
and seizure, the Court will first look at the facts available to the officers
prior to the search and, from the evidence, then decide the probability
that a crime might have been occurring.42 If there is a reasonably
strong possibility that criminal activity may be afoot, the search will be
37. Bacigel, supra note 21, at 771.
38. 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1948). Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The Beck Court
stated that a "constitutionally valid [arrest] depends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest
was made, the officers had probable cause to make it."
39. Rothblatt, EVIDENCE FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS 66 (1965). See generally Armentano, supra
note 18.
40. Accord, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Katz Court stated:
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magis-
trate, areper se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions.
The five judicially recognized exceptions to the general warrant rule, however, must have prob-
able cause to be sustainable.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (search of an automobile); Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to valid arrest); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968) (searches to which the defendant has consented); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1947) (searches under exigent circumstances); Santana v. United States, 427 U.S. 38 (1978)
(search in hot pursuit).
41. One troublesome area where the Court has focused a lot of its attention is the warrantless
search of an automobile. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948), the Court held that
incriminating statements made by the defendant were sufficient probable cause to search a car
without a warrant. Citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court noted that the
subjective belief that the car was heavily loaded and that the officer had arrested Brinegar five
months earlier for transporting liquor also was sufficient probable cause for a non-warrant search.
338 U.S. at 169-70. Although the Court did not address whether probable cause existed to stop
Brinegar's vehicle, it found that "the ultimate facts" within the officer's knowledge were sufficient
to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed. Id at 166,
175-176. For a discussion of the automobile exception to the fourth amendment warrant require-
ment, see note 158 infra.
42. One noted commentator believes probable cause is simply "more probable than not."
LaFave, Street Encounters and the Constitution.- Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 46, 73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LaFave, Street Encounters].
6
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sustained.43 In Brinegar v. United States, Justice Rutledge stated the
following standard for probable cause:
In dealing with probable cause,. . . as the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru-
dent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accord-
ingly correlative to what must be proved." .
Furthermore, the probable-cause standard implicitly requires that
the officer scrutinize the entire situation before initiating his search. If,
under the circumstances a reasonable man would conclude the pres-
ence of criminal activity is more probable than not, probable cause ex-
ists.4" "[A] line ...must be drawn by an [officer's] act of judgment
formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken of
all the circumstances."'  Thus, under the traditional standard, prob-
able cause must be established prior to the commencement of any
search and seizure. Conversely, probable cause established through in-
vestigative search and seizure procedures are impermissible. For ex-
ample, in Mallory v. United States,47 three Black men who had access
to a basement where a rape occurred, and who fit the general descrip-
tion of the rapist, were arrested. In rejecting the constitutionality of
petitioner's seizure, the Court stated:
The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion .... [W]homever the
police arrest, they must arrest on 'probable cause.' It is not the function
of the police to arrest. . . at large and to use an interrogating process
m ..in order to determine whom ...should be charge[d] before a
committing magistrate on 'probable cause. '48
To establish probable cause, each search and seizure must have a
strong independent showing that a particular crime has, in fact, oc-
curred. In Beck v. Ohio,49 the Court held that the police had no prob-
able cause to search the defendant after stopping his vehicle simply
because they knew he had a gambling record. In Beck, the officers
ordered the defendant out of his car, arrested him and then searched
his car.50 Finding nothing, the officers searched the defendant and
found clearing house slips in his sock.5" Using a reasonable man stan-
dard, the Court found there was insufficient evidence of probable cause
43. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1948), discussed at note 41 supra, where
the Court stated: "The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground
for the belief of guilt."
44. Id
45. LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 42, at 74.
46. 338 U.S. at 176.
47. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
48. Id at 454, 456.
49. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
50. Id at 90.
51. Id
7
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in the record to arrest Beck without a warrant, because there "[was] not
* . . a single objective fact to support belief by the officers that the peti-
tioner was engaged in criminal activity at the time they arrested him."52
Beck is typical of many Supreme Court decisions which have invali-
dated searches and seizures that were initiated either without a clear
showing of probable cause or a search warrant allegedly based on
probable cause.53 Although it has long been established that a search
warrant is not always required to commence a search,54 there are situa-
tions where the privacy interest of an individual 5 is so paramount that
52. Id at 95. A search incident to a lawful arrest is reasonable under the fourth amendment.
See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1958). Cf.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
53. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (search warrant limited to a tavern and its
bartender does not extend probable cause to independently search the bar's patrons); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1978). In Dunaway, the Court rejected the custodial detainment of a
suspect by police without probable cause or an arrest warrant. In suppressing the incriminating
statements the defendant later made while in custody, the Court refused to extend the Terry rea-
sonable suspicion standard to permit custodial interrogations initiated on less than probable
cause.
See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (inculpatory statements made by suspect for-
mally arrested on less than probable cause suppressed); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974)
(arrest without a warrant must be based on probable cause); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
(search warrant issued on insufficient basis for probable cause invalidated).
54. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to a valid arrest); Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (search
conducted under "exceptional" or "exigent" circumstances); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948) (valid consent for the search is given); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (im-
practicable to secure a warrant).
The Court, however, always has favored searches conducted with a warrant. See Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), where the Court stated:
Thus when a search is based upon a magistrate's, rather than a police officer's, determination
of probable cause, the reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less 'judicially competent or
persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his own without a war-
rant,' . and will sustain the judicial determination so long as there [is a] substantial basis
Id at Ill (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960)). But cf United States v. Ross,
102 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-73 (1982) (legitimately stopped vehicle may be searched by police officers as
thoroughly as a magistrate could authorize by a warrant).
55. The Supreme Court originally interpreted the fourth amendment as protecting property
interests because any unconstitutional search and seizure of private property was considered a
trespass. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the Court said: "Itt] is . . .
incumbent upon the [government] to show the law by which this seizure is warranted. If that
cannot be done, it is a trespass . ... This right of property is set aside by positive law." Id at
627. See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1927). However, in the 1967 landmark case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, the Court
abandoned the traditional "constitutionally protected area" standard and held instead that the
fourth amendment "protects people, not places." Id at 351. This reinterpretation of the fourth
amendment extended its protections to wherever an individual has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." Id at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
For a good discussion of the general implications of Katz, see Note, The Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy-Katz v. United States, a postscriptum, 44 IND. L. REV. 468 (1968); Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy. A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protections, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 968 (1968).
Other courts have interpreted the fourth amendment as protecting values other than privacy.
8
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a search warrant based on probable cause is usually an absolute pre-
requisite to conducting a search and seizure. 6 The right of privacy in
one's abode is where fourth amendment protections traditionally have
been the strongest.5 Accordingly, where a search of a home is at issue,
probable cause must be the strongest because, absent exigent circum-
stances, a search and seizure will not be permitted without a search
warrant issued by a judge or magistrate.5" This privacy notion is epito-
mized in Johnson v. United States, 9 where the Court held that officers
who detected opium smoke emanating from a hotel room had insuffi-
cient probable cause to search the room without first obtaining a war-
rant. The Johnson rationale, which generally is recognized as the
"highwater mark" of the probable cause standard,6" soon fell into dis-
favor primarily because many governmental activities could not com-
port with the traditionally rigid probable cause requirements. 6'
Consequently, in order to accommodate what the Court considered im-
portant governmental objectives, it began to dilute the traditional prob-
able cause requirements through a balancing analysis.62
The Court first employed a balancing test in determining fourth
amendment violations in Camara v. Municipal Court.63  In Camara a
lower standard of probable cause was announced for administrative in-
See United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 870 (5th Cir. 1975), a'd in part and re 'd in part per
curiam on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 (1976) (right to be left alone); Fixel v. Wainright, 492 F.2d 480
(5th Cir. 1974) (the right of individuality).
56. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (sanctity of the home is the core
value of the fourth amendment).
57. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Payton Court stated: "It is a 'basic
principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively
unreasonable." Id at 586. See generally 2 LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, §§ 4.1, 4.4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE].
58. Seegeneraly LaFave, SEARCH & SEIZURE, supra note 57 at I § 312. In Shadwick v. City
of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1922), the Court articulated a two-prong test for magistrate-issued war-
rants. First, the magistrate must be "neutral and detached." Second, he must be able to deter-
mine if probable cause exists. Id at 350. For a listing of exceptions to the warrant requirement,
see note 40 supra.
59. 333 U.S. 140 (1947).
60. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959). A case that suggests that Johnson would
be decided differently today is Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). In Ker the Court upheld the
warrantless search of an apartment on the officer's suspicion that its occupants were drug dealers
and that contraband was present in the apartment.
61. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See Bacigel, supra note 21, at 776.
62. Id Bacigel believes that the overruling of Frank by Camara v. Municipal Court generally
is regarded as the beginning of the fall of the traditional monolithic view of the fourth amend-
ment. Id at 777. See LaFave, STREET ENCOUNTERS, supra note 42, at 55. Other cases in which
the Court has applied a balancing test include Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
(search of automobile driver after car is lawfully detained); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976) (fixed checkpoint stop to check for aliens); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972) (frisk for weapons on reasonable suspicion).
63. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). This case partially overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959).
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spections. 6 The Camara Court first stated that a search warrant must
be obtained by administrative inspectors.65 Probable cause to justify an
inspection warrant "need not depend upon specific knowledge of the
condition of the particular dwelling."66 Instead, the passage of time, the
nature of the building, or the condition of the entire area, may furnish
probable cause to justify a warrant.67 The Court reached this diluted
standard of probable cause "by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails.
68
Therefore, the Court in Camara and its companion case, See v. City
of Seattle,69 advanced a lower standard of probable cause for adminis-
trative searches than that required for criminal searches.70 In doing so,
the Court abandoned the basic probable cause principle that an objec-
tively perceived presence of seizable items is the exclusive justification
for a search7 and replaced it with a reasonableness standard which
64. See LaFave, STREET ENCOUNTERS, supra note 42, at 55.
65. 387 U.S. at 528-531.
66. Id at 538.
67. Id
68. Id at 537. The Court discussed factors to be considered, noting:
First, such [inspection] programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance...
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated
• . . Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discov-
ery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's
privacy.
Id
69. 387 U.S. 549 (1967). See applied the Camara rule to commercial buildings.
70. Note, Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.: Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 9
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 149, 155 (1978). [Hereinafter cited as Admin. Inspections].
71. After Camara and See, however, it was still unclear whether all administrative inspec-
tions had to fit within the warrant requirement. Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), was the Court's first attempt to clarify this issue. In Colonnade Ca-
tering, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents, acting without a warrant, forcibly entered the store-
room of a restaurant pursuant to a federal statute which permitted warrantless inspections of
federally licensed dealers of alcohol. Id at 73-74. In holding that the statute precludes forcible
entries without a warrant, the Colonnade Catering Court implied that the federal statute could
provide for warrantless searches and seizures of businesses that are regulated by the government.
Id at 77. The Court noted that in businesses where government regulation is pervasive, the need
for a warrant based upon probable cause is unnecessary as long as it is authorized by Congress.
Accordingly, in industries with a history of governmental control, the fourth amendment protec-
tions of a search warrant based on probable cause are inapplicable. Id Administrative Inspections,
supra note 70 at 157.
Because Colonnade Catering involved a forced, warrantless search and seizure, the Court did
not discuss the validity of warrantless inspections without probable cause. However, in United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1971), the Court addressed the validity of surprise, warrantless
inspections authorized by statute. In Biswell a federally licensed guns dealer was ordered by a
warrantless Treasury agent to open up a storeroom containing guns. After initially protesting, the
respondent unlocked the storeroom, where the agent found an unlicensed gun. Id at 312. The
Court, in upholding the search, stated that the fourth amendment warrant requirement was inap-
plicable because the statute's importance in preventing violent crime was paramount to the "negli-
gible protections afforded by a warrant" based on probable cause. Id at 315-316. Furthermore,
in regulated areas where surprise is necessary for "effective enforcement," the Court concluded
that a warrant "could [too] easily frustrate [the] inspection. ... Id at 316. By completely aban-
10
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balanced diverse societal interests. More importantly, the lesser stan-
dard for probable cause articulated in Camara and See through a bal-
ancing test formed the basis for a departure from the traditional
probable cause requirement.72 As later decisions will indicate, under a
balancing analysis, the broad interests of society will almost always su-
persede those of the individual and thus the search will always be per-
missible.73 The constitutionally protected expectation of privacy
cannot keep the door closed when society knocks,74 because, when
looked at in a broad sociological sense, the interests of the individual
must be subordinated to those of society. 75
doning the warrant requirement in this situation, the Birwell Court has effectively stripped certain
regulated industries of all fourth amendment protections. This exposes these enterprises to unlim-
ited inspections, all on which may be executed without the existence of any probability that there
is a statutory violation. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amend-
ment. A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1011, 1022-1023 (1973).
However, in regulated areas where the public regulatory interest is not as pervasive, the warrant
requirement must be met. In Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), the Court considered
whether the inspection provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), permitting
warrantless entry onto an employer's business premises, was constitutional. The Court held that
the OSHA provision authorizing warrantless inspections of business premises closed to the public
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. Citing See and Camara, the Court
stated that the warrant clause "protects commercial buildings as well as private homes." Id at
311. The Court distinguished Colonnade Catering and Biswell by noting that these cases involved
enterprises with a "long tradition of close government supervision .... whereas the petitioner
here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business." Id at 313. The Court, therefore,
concluded that industries which are not closely regulated must fall within the warrant require-
ment.
Through its balancing analysis, the Barlows Court also articulated a lower standard of probable
cause upon which an administrative search warrant may be issued. It concluded that, in order to
prevent the warrant requirement from becoming an unmanageable administrative nightmare,
traditional probable cause need not be present to issue the warrant. The Barlows Court stated:
Probable cause in the criminal sense is not required. For purposes of an administrative
search ... , probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant may be based not only on
specific evidence of an existing violation but also on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
establishment.'
Id at 310. Accordingly, the Court announced a diluted probable cause requirement for adminis-
trative searches. Although this weak probable cause standard provides some guarantee of judicial
control over the administrative inspection process, it clearly does not afford the same protections
as the traditional criminal law standard. Because an OSHA search warrant will be issued on the
mere administrative showing of general OSHA criteria for the institution of an inspection, the
requisite probable cause is rubber stamped by the issuing magistrate. See id at 321, n. 17. More
importantly, Barlows is indicative of the general trend that the traditional probable cause standard
is breaking down with no clear end to this destructive process in sight.
72. Bacigel, supra note 21, at 778.
73. Eg., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), discussed.infra at notes 109-117 and ac-
companying text; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussed infra at notes 76-105 and accompa-
nying text.
74. This result is probable because "there is no ready test for determining [fourth amend-
ment] reasonableness." 387 U.S. at 536-37.
75. See generally Katz v. United States, 339 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Court stated that
the fourth amendment protects people, not places, from arbitrary intrusions. Id at 351. See note
55, supra for a discussion of Katz. Accord, Bacigel, supra note 21, at 778.
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III. TERRY V. OHIO: THE SEMINAL CASE
The Camara balancing test laid the foundation for Terry v. Ohio, 6
the first case to sustain a search and seizure on less than probable
cause. In Terry, a police officer observed the petitioner and two con-
federate "casing" a store for a long period of time. He eventually ap-
proached the three suspects, identified himself, and asked them for
their names.77 When they gave a mumbled response, the officer spun
Terry around and frisked him by patting Terry's outer clothing. 8 Af-
ter feeling a hard object, the officer then reached into the suspect's
pocket and removed a pistol.7 9 The trial court denied a suppression
motion to exclude the gun, and Terry was convicted of carrying a con-
cealed weapon. The conviction was affirmed by the Ohio court of
appeals8 ' and an appeal to the Ohio supreme court was dismissed. Af-
ter granting certiorari,82 the Supreme Court first noted that it would not
decide whether there was probable cause in this case.8" Instead, the
Terry Court focused on whether this "stop and frisk" was an unreason-
able search and seizure. 8 The Court then defined the officer's stop and
frisk of Terry within fourth amendment terminology. It noted that
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-
dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person."8 " Furthermore, the
76. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Professor LaFave stated that Camara "was immediately recognized as
pointing the way toward the Court's acceptance of the rationale supporting stop and frisk."
LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 42, at 58.
The "stop and frisk" doctrine was just beginning to heat up in the state courts. New York
already had passed a stop and frisk law. See People v. Taggart, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 229 N.E.2d 581
(1967); People v. Pugach, 225 N.Y.S.2d 833, 204 N.E.2d 176 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 936
(1965); People v. Rivera, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). For
an excellent analysis of this issue in Pennsylvania, see Caracappa, Terry v. Ohio and the Power of
Police to Accost Citizens Absent Probable Cause: A Critical Look at the Pennsylvania Experience,
16 DuQ. L. REV. 499 (1977-78). By 1968, the authority to stop and frisk suspicious persons had
been granted in Alabama, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Rhode Island, and California. Landynski, supra note 4, at 156.
77. 392 U.S. at 7.
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id at 7-8.
81. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
82. Terry v. Ohio, 387 U.S. 929 (1967).
83. 392 U.S. at 20. The Terry Court thus implied that there was no probable cause here to
sustain the search. The Court said: "If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether 'probable cause' existed to
justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case." Id Presumably,
the above statement also implies that less than probable cause will always be insufficient to sustain
a search pursuant to a warrant.
84. Id The Terry Court proclaimed that this type of police conduct did not fall within the
warrant requirement and thus it would not focus on probable cause. "Instead, the conduct in-
volved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." Id (footnote omitted).
85. 392 U.S. at 16.
12
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Court characterized the "exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing" as a "search '' 6 but rejected the state's argument that fourth
amendment protections do "not come into play" until a "technical ar-
rest" or "full blown search" has occurred. 87
The Terry Court then discussed what it considered the central in-
quiry in all fourth amendment disputes-"the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's
personal security."88 The Court refused to apply the probable cause
standard and instead applied a Camara balancing test. In balancing
the individual's right against arbitrary and frivolous interference and
the government's interest in efficient and safe law enforcement, 9 the
Court upheld the search, noting:
[Tihere must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has
reason to believe he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individ-
ual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime.
90
The Court also limited the police officer's authority to search only
when the officer could point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably
warranted the intrusion.9 1 It added that an officer may draw upon spe-
cific, reasonable inferences from the situation in light of his experience
to determine if his suspicions justify a search.9" Thus, the Court cre-
ated an exception to the probable cause requirement by using a "rea-
sonable suspicion" test to sustain a stop and frisk under the fourth
amendment.93
86. Id
87. Id at 19. The Court added: "'Search' and 'seizure' are not talismans." Id
88. Id
89. Id at 20-27. The Court cited Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Id at 21.
90. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).
91. Id at 21. The Court also noted that under this reasonable man standard, the police
actions must be predicated on objective, specific facts. "Inarticulable hunches" or "good faith"
belief would not sustain a search or seizure. Id
92. Id at 27-28.
93. See supra notes 12-78 and accompanying text. But see 392 U.S. at 35 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). Justice Douglas believed that the Terry majority should have employed a probable
cause analysis to determine the fourth amendment reasonableness of the Terry "stop and frisk."
He stated that probable cause is an absolute requirement for all searches and seizures and, there-
fore, no exceptions to the standard should exist. Quoting extensively from Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), the dissent warned
that by creating an exception to the probable cause requirement, the majority would be undermin-
ing the basic historical imperatives of the fourth amendment. More importantly, the dissent con-
cluded that contrary to established authority, the Terry majority gave police greater authority to
commence a search and seizure "than a judge has to authorize such action .... To give the
police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path." There-
fore, only through a constitutional amendment would Justice Douglas authorize the police to
search and seize without probable cause. He stated that:
13
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However, according to Chief Justice Warren, writing for the major-
ity, the revolutionary new exception to probable cause was to be ap-
plied only in very limited circumstances. 94 He stated that the "sole
justification" for the new standard was to protect the police officer and
others in his immediate vicinity, and that any search must be "confined
in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives,
clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police of-
ficer."9 5 Moreover, the Terry Court reiterated the protections created
by the fourth amendment and added that the police "must whenever
practical obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures."96
While Terry constituted a subtle erosion of the fourth amendment
guarantee 97 of probable cause, the Terry holding was a practical solu-
tion to the daily dangers faced by law enforcement officers on the
street. The holding that a stop and frisk can be predicated on less than
probable cause is an important attempt to provide the necessary tools
to minimize those dangers.98 Furthermore, the rights of the accused in
these situations generally are still protected because the search must be
narrow in scope and can only be initiated upon a "reasonable suspi-
cion" that the suspect is armed and dangerous. 99 Thus, the Terry Court
clearly intended, by limiting its holding, that "reasonable suspicion"
not become an abusive tool of the police.
Accordingly, the narrowness of Terry was evinced in its companion
case, Sibron v. New York."°° In Sibron, an officer observed the defend-
ant for several hours and saw him converse with at least six known
Perhaps such a step-is desirable to cope with modem forms of lawlessness. But if it is taken, it
should be the deliberate choice of the people through a constitutional amendment. . . . [I]f
the individual is no longer to be sovereign, [and] if the police can. . . pick him up whenever
they do not like the cut of his jib, . . . we enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should
be made only after a full debate by the people of this country.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
94. The Court indicated the limitations of the Terry holding, noting:
ITIhe narrow question posed by the facts . . . [is] whether it is always unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is
probable cause for arrest. Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to
canvass in detail the constitutional limits upon the scope of a policeman's power when he
confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him.
Id at 15-16.
95. Id at 29.
96. Id at 20 (footnotes omitted in text). The Court added "that in most instances failure to
comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances."
97. See Gilligan, Continuing Evisceration of the Fourth Amendment, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
823 (1976).
98. Contra, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice
Douglas' Terry dissent, see supra note 93.
99. Id at 29.
100. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The third companion case was Peter v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968), where a frisk by a police officer which revealed burglary tools was upheld when the officer,
who saw two strangers tiptoeing away from his apartment building, received unsatisfactory re-
sponses to his inquiry.
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narcotics addicts. The officer approached the defendant and stated,
"You know what I am after,"'' and proceeded to reach into Sibron's
pocket where he found heroin packets. The Court held that the search
was unreasonable because it was not confined to a protective frisk for
weapons, and there was insufficient probable cause to justify an arrest.
The Sibron Court thus concluded that the reasonable suspicion excep-
tion was inapplicable to the circumstances in this case.
Despite the fact that Terry was the first case ever to sustain a search
and seizure initiated on less than probable cause, it was in no way in-
tended to signal the demise of the probable cause requirement. It
merely created "a narrowly drawn authority" to enable police officers
to protect themselves against "armed and dangerous individuals."' 0 2
Moreover, the Terry Court noted that this "serious" intrusion upon the
seized individual can be only for the discovery of weapons and may not
become an excuse for a total search.
[The search] must . . .be limited to that which is necessary for the
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or
others... and may realistically be characterized as something less than
a "full" search .... [The officer may] not conduct a general explora-
tory search for whatever [other] evidence of criminal activity he might
find. 103
The Terry Court thus made a strong effort to preserve the probable
cause requirement by strictly limiting its holding to defensive police
procedures to be used only in dangerous situations. Terry was an at-
tempt to make the fourth amendment more responsive to what the
Court perhaps perceived as an increasingly violent society that was be-
coming more hostile to police officers." ° However, these new protec-
tions afforded police officers clearly were designed to limit any possible
erosion of the probable cause requirement in other areas of law en-
forcement. The Court stated the "search [in Terry] is not justified by
any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of
crime,"" '5 thus precluding police use of Terry for the prevention or dis-
covery of crime. Accordingly, the Terry doctrine would have had an
inconsequential effect on the fourth amendment protections against un-
reasonable searches and seizures if all the limitations placed on its use
were adhered to, i.e., if it had been strictly applied to protection in dan-
gerous situations, the patdown very limited in scope, and no aggressive
investigatory law enforcement motives were underlying the search.
101. 392 U.S. at 45.
102. 392 U.S. at 27.
103. Id at 26, 30.
104. See id at 24 n.21.
105. Id at 29.
15
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IV. ADAMS v WILLIAMS: AN EXPANSION
OF TERRY TO INFORMERS
Despite the narrow scope given by the Terry Court to the reasonable
suspicion standard,"° and its apparent intention to limit the exceptions
to situations where immediate action is required,l'O the Court later ex-
panded Terry to situations where there is no danger to the officer or the
public and no need for immediate police action. 08 The extension of
the Terry reasonable suspicion standard to informants' tips clearly il-
lustrates this trend.
In Adams v. Williams 109 the Court upheld a stop and frisk based on
an unverified informant's tip that the defendant, who was sitting in a
parked car, possessed drugs and a weapon." t0 The officer approached
the car, tapped on the window, and when the defendant rolled down
his window, reached in and seized a gun from Adams' waist. " I I Heroin
subsequently was found in the defendant's possession. The Adams
Court noted that the tip failed the probable cause test.' 12 However, the
majority held that the unverified tip was sufficient, under the reason-
able suspicion standard, to form the belief that Adams was armed and
dangerous because the tip was supported by a "sufficient indicia of reli-
ability."" 3 The majority noted three factors that were present to create
106. Id at 62-65.
107. Professor LaFave suggests that Terry is only applicable to those situations in which the
police must take immediate action. See 3 LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, slpra note 57, at 25.
108. E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (Court upheld warrantless search of
person suspected of stealing credit cards); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (Court
upheld warrantless search of a car impounded for parking violations). For commentators' views
on the expansion of Terry to nondangerous situations, see Gilligan, supra note 97; Yackle, The
Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 25 KAN. L. REV. 437 (1978).
109. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
110. Id at 145. The officer was patrolling a high-crime neighborhood when an informant
approached the officer's car and told him that an individual seated in a nearby car had a gun and
drugs.
111. Id
112. Id at 147. Justice Rehnquist concluded: "[T]he Court's decisions indicate that this in-
formant's unverified tip may have been insufficient for a[n] ... arrest or search warrant."
113. Id at 147. Contra, id at 157 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated:
[A] search and seizure cannot be justified on the basis of conclusory allegations of an un-
named informant who is allegedly credible. . . .Since the testimony of the arresting officer
in the instant case patently fails to demonstrate that the informant was known to be trustwor-
thy and since it is also clear that the officer had no idea of the source of the informant's
'knowledge,' a search and seizure would have been illegal.
In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), the Court articulated a two-prong test for prob-
able cause based on informers' tips. First, the tip must contain sufficient information having suffi-
cient grounds that the person giving the tip is reliable, i.e., the person must be responsible and
credible. Second, the tip must contain a sufficient statement of the circumstances from which the
informer drew his conclusion that the suspect was engaged in criminal conduct, i.e., there must be
enough information for the informer to conclude that the suspect was engaging in a criminal
activity. Id See generally Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); United States v. McLeroy, 584
F.2d 746, 748 (5th Cir. 1978).
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reliability. First, the informant was known to the officer; second, the
informant previously had provided information to the officer; and
third, the informant gave information that could be personally verified
at the scene." 4
The extension in Adams of reasonable suspicion to unverified in-
formers' tips triggered a further dilution of the probable cause standard
in this area." 5 Lower federal and state courts have further expanded
the reasonable suspicion standard by using it to validate searches
promulgated by informants' tips from unverified, and thus often unreli-
able sources." 6 These holdings have effectively undermined the Terry
limitation that reasonable suspicion would only justify a search in dan-
gerous situations, and therefore, have encouraged aggressive and possi-
bly abusive police actions that otherwise would be barred by the
probable cause requirement.' 17
Despite the increasing expansion of the Terry doctrine by the lower
courts, the Supreme Court continually has refusedto decide whether an
anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion to conduct a
search. 18 By constantly denying certiorari to state and circuit court
cases,' '9 the Court, presumably, is approving the continual expansion
of reasonable suspicion in state and federal courts to anonymous and
114. 407 U.S. at 146.
115. E.g., United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973). Cf United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). Both cases are discussed infra at
notes 159-166 and accompanying text.
116. The test for informant tips is stated in note 113 supra. See, e.g., United States v. Cage,
494 F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 959 (1974); United States v. Jefferson, 480 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1001 (1973); United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 410 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 979 (1973). Accord, United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Preston, 468 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1972). Contra, United States v. DeVita, 526 F.2d 81, 82 (9th Cir.
1975).
See also People v. Tooks, 403 Mich. 568, 271 N.W.2d 503 (1978); State exrel H.B., 75 N.J. 243,
381 A.2d 759 (1977); People v. Kinlock, 43 N.Y.2d 832, 402 N.Y.S.2d 573, 373 N.E.2d 327 (1977).
But see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, 392 A.2d 1298 (1978); Jackson v. State, 157 Ind.
App. 662, 301 N.E.2d 370 (1973). Three decisions have disapproved stops based on information
received from a police dispatcher, the source of which was unknown. See Price v. State, 37 Md.
App. 248, 376 A.2d 1158 (1977); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14, 251 N.W.2d 659 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 833 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976).
117. See Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissenting), where
the circuit court upheld the search. Justice Friendly states: "I greatly fear that if the decision here
should be followed, Terry will have opened the sluice gates for serious and unintended erosion of
the Fourth Amendment." Id at 39 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
118. See dissent of Justice White from a denial of certiorari in Jernigan v. Louisiana, 377 So.
2d 1222 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958 (1980). See also United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d
159 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 959 (1974).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080
(1978); State v. Benson, 198 Neb. 14, 251 N.W.2d 659, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); United
States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973); United States v.
Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 959 (1974). See also Jernigan v.
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uncorroborated tips.' 20 Since there are growing divisions in the state
and federal courts on this issue, 2 ' it should only be a matter of time
before the Supreme Court officially extends reasonable suspicion to
anonymous tipsters.
The use of reasonable suspicion to conduct a search based on anony-
mous information, furthermore, is a dangerous law enforcement tech-
nique. 22 Anonymous tips merely raise a weak possibility of criminal
conduct, 23 and, therefore, should not justify widespread investigatory
searches in the absence of probable cause that a crime is about to take
place.' 24 These investigatory stops based on less than probable cause
clearly are not within the narrow scope of Terry. The fourth amend-
ment rights of the individual are at the mercy of the police officer who
may stop and search an individual at will upon the suggestion by a
usually unreliable, unknown, or, perhaps, vengeful third person that
the suspect is committing a crime. Moreover, the expectation that the
police officer will limit his search to a light patdown of the suspect
under the Terry guidelines is impossible to enforce. 25
Reasonable suspicion based on an informant's tip, the reliability,
motive, and credibility of which is always suspect, was clearly not
within the narrow guidelines promulgated in Terry. Under the Terry
rationale, there is little basis to extend reasonable suspicion to situa-
tions where there is no apparent danger and the crime is possession of
Louisiana, 377 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958 (1980); United States v. Walker,
294 A.2d 376 (D.C. App. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973).
120. But cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), discussed supra at notes 106-127 and
accompanying text; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (informers were known to the
officer and had provided reliable information in the past).
121. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Louisiana, 377 So. 2d 1222 (Sup. Ct. La.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958
(1980). In Jernigan the New Orleans police received an anonymous phone call that a black man
fitting a certain description and wearing a gun, could be found at a bar. An officer was dispatched
to the bar, conducted a Terry search on the petitioner, and located a firearm. Jernigan was con-
victed of illegal possession of a gun, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.
See Justice White's dissent from the denial of certiorari. Id at 958. The circuit courts are
divided on whether Terry stops are permissible from an anonymous tip. Compare United States v.
McLeroy, 584 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.
1976), with United States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 6114 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 959 (1974).
122. See People v. Taggart, 283 N.Y.S.2d I, 9, 229 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1967). The Court stated:
"It is recognized ... that using anonymous information as a basis for intrusive police action is
highly dangerous. It should not extend to all contraband or criminal violations." Id
123. LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 42, at 78. Professor LaFave does not believe that
anonymous tips should be completely ignored. He suggests they only should be used to survey the
scene or the individual and if the necessary probable cause arises, a search then should be
conducted.
124. In possession violations, for example, no dangerous act is about to take place, nor is there
a need for immediate action to negate an apparently dangerous situation. See People v. Taggart,
283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9, 229 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1967).
125. See People v. Taggart, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6, 229 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1967) (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
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contraband.' 26  The protections afforded by the fourth amendment
probable cause standard should not be at the mercy of an unverified
and unreliable informer. The government, when it relies on a tip to
justify a Terry stop, should either reveal the name of the informer or
prove that his "name is unknown and could not otherwise have been
ascertained."'' 2' This minimal requirement would, at least, help pre-
vent abusive and discretionary police actions by removing the "tempta-
tion for police to go on fishing expeditions for contraband."' 
28
V. REASONABLE SUSPICION AT THE BORDER AND INWARD
Adams and its lower-court progeny implicitly rejected the Terry no-
tion that the reasonable suspicion exception will be strictly limited to
the type of crime under suspicion. 29  This effectively has laid the
groundwork for the dilution of the probable cause standard in other
law enforcement areas. In these situations the crime is much less
threatening to the officer's safety than those of Terry or Adams and
clearly are not within the limited "stop and frisk" scope of the Terry
guidelines. 3 ' Illustrative of this expansion is border patrol searches.
After initially rejecting the validity of searches by border patrols on
less than probable cause,' 3 ' the Court later extended the reasonable
126. LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 42, at 66. Professor LaFave states that Terry ex-
plicitly deals with prevention of crime and not its detection. Id.
127. 436 F.2d at 39 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
128. See LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 42, at 65-66. Professor LaFave states that the
present stop and frisk standards should be renamed "stop and fish." Id at 66.
129. See Caracappa, supra note 76, at 511. This commentator states that Adams failure to
address this question after it had been raised below "suggests the Court has no intention of placing
[any] limitations on this police investigatory tool." Id at 511. See dissent of Judge Friendly at
note 117, supra. Contra, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway the police
detained the defendant on less than probable cause based on implicating statements made by a jail
inmate. After being taken into custody, but not arrested, the petitioner made incriminating state-
ments which later led to his indictment and conviction for felony murder. The Dunaway Court
rejected New York's contention that the police could detain the defendant on a reasonable suspi-
cion that he had committed a crime and held that probable cause was required to detain a suspect
for custodial interrogations. 1d at 207, 216. It noted that it would be "careful [to maintain the
narrow scope] of Terry" and refused to employ a balancing test in investigatory seizure situations
where there are severe intrusions on individual liberty. Id. at 215, 216.
See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (investigatory arrest on less than probable cause
rejected); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-727 (1969) (fingerprints taken from suspect de-
tained without probable cause violates fourth amendment).
130. See Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. at 30 (1968). The Terry Court said that when an officer
reasonably suspects that a suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a stop and protective
search only on less than probable cause. Id (emphasis added).
131. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). In Almeida-Sanchez, the peti-
tioner, a Mexican citizen who was legitimately in the United States on a work permit, was stopped
approximately 25 miles from the Mexican border by a Border Patrol searching for illegal aliens
under the authority of the Immigration Nationality Act, which provides for searches of vehicles
within 100 air miles of the United States border. The petitioner's car was searched and marijuana
was discovered. The Court rejected the Camara balancing approach and held that the warrantless
search of the petitioner's car away from the border without probable cause or consent was unrea-
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suspicion standard to this area through a Camara-Terry balancing test
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.32 In Brignoni-Ponce, a nighttime
border patrol, looking for illegal aliens, stopped a car that was heading
north about 65 miles from the Mexican border.'33 The Court rejected
the stop because the patrol's reason for pulling over the respondent's
car was that its three occupants, two of whom turned out to be illegal
aliens, "appeared to be of Mexican descent."' 34 In characterizing the
stop of the vehicle as a fourth amendment "seizure," the Court, rather
than focusing on whether the stop was based on probable cause, instead
balanced the public interest of preventing illegal aliens from entering
this country 35 against the intrusion on individual freedom. It found
that the Government had made a convincing demonstration that the
public interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry
of aliens at the Mexican border, relative to the "limited" intrusion on
civil liberties. 136  By holding that an investigative stop on less than
probable cause was permissible,' 37 the Brignoni-Ponce Court officially
recognized that a Terry "seizure" based on reasonable suspicion was
applicable in situations that were not dangerous to law enforcement
officials.
Citing Terry, the Court also noted that in determining whether suffi-
cient reasonable suspicion to stop a car beyond the border existed, the
officer had to point to several specific, articulable and objective facts
indicating that criminal activity was afoot. 3 ' Accordingly, it invali-
sonable under the fourth amendment. Id at 269-275. Justice White, in dissent, approved of this
search pursuanlto the statute authorizing such searches. See id at 285-299 (White, J., dissenting).
132. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). For further discussion of the Brignoni-Ponce holding, see Note,
Reasonable Suspicionfor Border Patrol Stops, 15 THE COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 277 (1976).
In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), the Court later applied the Almeida-Sanchez
probable cause standard to checkpoint searches beyond the border or its functional equivalent. In
Ortiz, the defendant's car was stopped for no apparent reason at a traffic checkpoint about 60
miles from the border. A subsequent search of the car trunk revealed three illegal aliens. Id at
892. The Court held that vehicle searches must be based on probable cause, but refrained from
deciding whether probable cause is required to stop a car. Id at 895, 897 n.3. This issue was later
adjudicated in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), discussed supra and infra at
notes 127-137 and accompanying text.
133. Id at 875.
134. Id See United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1136 (1974) (racial appearance to support reasonable suspicion rejected).
135. Id at 881. The Court noted that the tremendous flow of illegal aliens in this country is a
"significant social and economic problem." Id at 878.
136. Id at 878, 880. The Court stated that the "intrusion is modest. The Government tells us
that a stop by a moving patrol consumes no more than a minute!" 1d (emphasis added).
137. See infra notes 138-139.
138. Id at 883. Prior to Brignoni-Ponce, the Court had limited searches and seizures on less
than probable cause to situations that were potentially dangerous to the police officer. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 110 (1968); Terry v. Ohio,
329 U.S. 1 (1968). It has been long established that searches at the border or its functional
equivalent do not need probable cause or a warrant and are per se reasonable. See Carroll v.
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dated the Brignoni-Ponce seizure because the officer's reliance on only
one factor, the apparent Mexican ancestry of the vehicle's occupants,
was insufficient to justify a stop on reasonable suspicion grounds. t39
The Brignoni-Ponce majority emphasized that "in all situations the of-
ficer is entitled to assess the facts in light of his experiences and the
search must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for...
[its] initiation."' 4 ° In Brignoni-Ponce, therefore, the Court placed two
limits upon border patrols in their determination of whether there is
reasonable suspicion to sustain a stop. First, the seizure is permissible
only in the absence of less intrusive or more practical alternatives. Sec-
ond, the suspicion must be based solely on the officer's personal obser-
vations of the vehicle and its occupants.' 4 '
Brignoni-Ponce, however, is indicative of the Court's further weaken-
ing of the probable cause standard.'4 2  Reasonable suspicion now is
applicable to situations in which there is no physical danger to the po-
lice or public. 143 Therefore, the exception can be used to justify broad-
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965); Mansfield v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Landau v.
United States Att'y, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 665 (1936). The rationale for
this exception is set forth in Carroll:
Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary, because of national self-
protection requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and
his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.
267 U.S. at 154.
139. 422 U.S. 884. The courts have recognized many other factors in determining whether a
border stop was based on probable cause. They include:
1) The characteristics of the area in which the vehicle is travelling, particularly its proximity to
the border, Accord, United States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1977) (Barnard's car was
from another country, but was spotted in an area where business or tourist traffic was unlikely);
United States v. Lara, 517 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1975) (stop in a sparsely populated area 314 miles
from the border upheld). Contra, United States v. George, 567 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1978) (stop of an
out-of-state vehicle early in the morning close to the border invalid); United States v. Lopez, 564
F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1977) (stop 55 miles from border invalid);
2) The usual traffic patterns of the roadway. See United States v. Sperow, 551 F.2d 808 (10th
Cir. 1977);
3) Previous experience with illegal aliens. Compare United States v. Barnard, 553 F.2d 389
(5th Cir. 1977) (heavily loaded automobile justification for a stop), and United States v. Larios-
Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974) (underlying circumstances and experience of officer enough
to justify founded suspicion), with United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1977) (ap-
pearance of vehicle on highway heading away from border did not constitute reason to believe car
was in fact coming from border with illegal aliens);
4) Characteristics of the vehicle and appearance of these suspects. Accord, United States v.
Barnard, 553 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1977).
140. 422 U.S. at 881 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).
141. 422 U.S. at 881; see supra note 119 and accompanying text. This personal observation
requirement is apparently more stringent than the standards articulated in Adams and its lower
court progeny which permitted suspicion to emanate from informants. See supra note 94-117 and
accompanying text.
142. 422 U.S. 873 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Note, Border Searches-A Prostitu-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, 10 ARIz. L. REV. 457 (1968).
143. This result contradicts Terry, where the Court stated:
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ranging investigative seizures. More importantly, the objective facts
creating a "reasonable suspicion" to justify a stop have evolved into the
officer's subjective assessment of personal and other characteristics,
many of which are consistent with innocent behavior. 144
Thus, the Brignoni-Ponce holding is a windfall for law enforcement
at the expense of individual freedoms. Its expansion of the reasonable
suspicion standard to non-violent crimes is a powerful law-enforcement
tool.' 45 The potential for police abuse of this new standard is made
evident by the following characterization of the suspicion test: "[T]he
nature of the test permits the police to interfere with a multitude of
law-abiding citizens, whose only transgression may be a nonconformist
appearance or attitude.'46
Traditional fourth amendment protections were eviscerated further
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,147 where the Court, using a
Brignoni-Ponce balancing test, held that vehicles may be stopped at
fixed checkpoints far away from the border in the absence of any ar-
ticulable suspicion. In Martinez-Fuerte, the petitioner was passing
through a checkpoint about 60 miles from the border where all cars
were visually screened. 48 He was instructed to proceed to a secondary
inspection area by an officer where it was discovered that his two pas-
sengers were illegal aliens.' 49  The petitioner argued that his fourth
amendment rights were violated because there was a clear lack of rea-
We. .. hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to
reasonably conclude in light ofhis experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous . . . he is entitledfor
theprotection of himself to conduct a carefully limited search in an attempt to discover weap-
ons which might be used to assault him.
397 U.S. at 30 (1968) (emphasis added).
144. The Terry Court authorized the police officer to assess the situation in light of his experi-
ence. Id at 30. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
145. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (stop based on profile of narcotics
couriers); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (automobile may be stopped on reasonable
suspicion); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (search pursuant to a legal detainment of
an automobile).
146. 422 U.S. at 889 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court created a civil remedy for individuals whose
fourth amendment rights had been violated. Bivens permitted the plaintiff to sue federal agents
for injuries resulting from the illegal break-in and search of his apartment as well as his subse-
quent arrest without probable cause. See generally Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims Act-an
alternative to the exclusionary rule? 66 J. CRIM. L. 1 (1975).
147. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See generally Note, Border Searches Revisited- The Constitutional
Propriety of Fixed and Temporary Checkpoint Searches, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 251 (1975).
148. Id at 547. The procedures at these checkpoint areas were as follows: All traffic was
funnelled into two lanes and a "point" agent visually screened all traffic as it passed by. The
Court noted that traffic was slowed enough to be considered "seized." Id at 546, n. 1. The point
man subjectively decided which cars were to be directed into a secondary inspection area where
citizenship or immigration status was to be revealed. Id
149. Id at 547. Martinez-Fuerte was charged with two counts of illegally transporting aliens
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Id at 547-48.
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sonable suspicion to warrant a stop. The Court responded, however,
that there was no automatic application of the Terry standard and
guidelines because reasonable suspicion was "a question to be resolved
by balancing the interests at stake."' 0 Through a balancing analysis,
the Court concluded that reasonable suspicion was too impractical and
burdensome a standard for checkpoint stops. 5 ' Accordingly, it noted
that the inconvenience of the secondary checkpoint stop was minimal,
relative to the public interest it serves, and that the inspection was lim-
ited to a "plain view" search. 52
Consequently, the Court refused to extend the diluted fourth amend-
ment standard of reasonable suspicion afforded roving patrol stops and
instead held that stops and questioning at checkpoints may be made
totally in the absence of any "individualized suspicion."153 In doing so,
the Martinez-Fuerte Court completely eliminated all fourth amend-
ment protections at arbitrarily established checkpoints, most of which
are scores of miles from any border. Motorists now may be stopped,
questioned, visually inspected and detained without any objective
standards. 54
Because all "seizures," even those of a brief duration, are covered by
the reasonableness protections of the fourth amendment, 155 the Marti-
nez-Fuerte holding is the most radical dilution of the probable cause
standard since Terry. It condones official arbitrary conduct by permit-
ting the subjective biases of checkpoint guards to pull over whomever
they want, whenever they want. 56 Furthermore, because the check-
point stop involves essentially the same intrusions as the Brignoni-
Ponce roving patrol stop, it is difficult to reconcile these two holdings.
These two holdings are especially difficult to distinguish because the
Brignoni-Ponce Court held that Mexican appearance is insufficient to
justify a roving patrol stop, and Martinez-Fuerte permits unlimited
"seizures" of any vehicles appearing to carry citizens of Mexican
150. Id at 556.
151. Id at 557. The majority stated that the flow of traffic was too heavy "to allow the partic-
ularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible courier of illegal
aliens." Id The Court also noted that the reasonable suspicion requirement would negate any
deterrent effect that these checkpoints have on "well-disguised smuggling operations." Id
152. Id at 558. Bui see United States v. Ortiz, discussed at note 132 supra, where a subse-
quent search could be conducted under probable cause.
153. Id at 562-563. Cf. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-887, discussed supra
at notes 132-146 and accompanying text.
154. 428 U.S. 543, 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Accord, id at 570 (Brennan, J., dissenting. In Terry, the Court stated: "the inestimable
right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen of the streets of our cities as to the home-
owner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." 392 U.S. at 8-9. Cf Ybarra v. Illinois,
444 U.S. 648 (1979) (fourth amendment protections exist in all public places); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 663 (fourth amendment protections in transportation).
156. 428 U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ancestry. '57
VI. AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: A COROLLARY OF
BRIGNONI-PONCE AND ITS PROGENY
Ever since Carroll v. United States,5  the automobile has been an
exception to the traditional warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment.'59 Although the Carroll Court maintained that probable cause
was required to search a vehicle, the Court never expressly articulated
157. Justice Brennan declared that this process would unfairly discriminate against citizens of
Mexican descent. He stated Mexicans, aliens, or descendants would now travel "at the risk of
being subjected not only to a stop, but also to a detention and interrogation, both prolonged and
to an extent far more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists." Id
158. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, the Court upheld the conviction of two bootleggers. It
noted that because a vehicle can be quickly removed from a jurisdiction before a warrant can be
secured, it is not unreasonable to permit warrantless searches of vehicles. 1d at 147. See note 158
infra.
159. See note 40 supra for discussion of other exceptions to the warrant requirement. This
exception permits a warrantless search of a vehicle stopped on the street or highway if there is
probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 760 (1979). In United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1982), the Court stated: "the
probable cause determination must be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a
warrant by a magistrate and not merely the subjective good faith of the police officers." Although
the special treatment of automobiles was justified because of the exigency that the vehicle may be
removed to another jurisdiction, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925), warrantless
searches have been permitted when the vehicle has been immobilized and is under police control.
See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam) (car was not searched until forty-five
minutes after being stopped by police); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (search permit-
ted under non-exigent circumstances). The Court's recent justifications for the warrantless search
of a vehicle under non-exigent circumstances is the diminished expectation of privacy the individ-
ual enjoys in an automobile as well as the administrative problems of temporarily detaining a
vehicle until a warrant is issued. 442 U.S. 753, 765, n. 14.
After Carroll and until 1970, the Court decided relatively few cases under the automobile ex-
ception. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), discussed at note 41 supra; Scher v.
United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (warrantless search of a car sitting in a garage appurtenant to a
private dwelling upheld);-Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (warrantless search of boot-
legger's car based on identified informant tip); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (warrant-
less search of a boat incident to lawful arrest based on probable cause).
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court upheld the validity of an automobile
that had been searched without a warrant at the police station subsequent to the arrest of its
driver. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court decided whether an auto-
mobile in police custody searched pursuant to an invalid warrant could then fall within the auto-
mobile exception, as a search incident to an arrest. The Coolidge Court found that there was a
lack of exigent circumstances to search without a valid warrant and held that the search did not fit
under the Chambers doctrine. Id at 463. In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), however, the
Court held that a warrantless seizure of an automobile in a public parking lot and the subsequent
warrantless examination of its exterior at a police impoundment area was permissible. The auto-
mobile exception does not extend to the search and seizure of luggage located within the vehicle.
In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the Court noted that the individual does not have a
lesser expectation of privacy in luggage located in an automobile and held that a search warrant
was required to search any luggage seized from an automobile. Id at 763-765 n.14. See also
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (warrantless search of opaque container in lawfully
stopped vehicle rejected), overruled, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982)).
This privacy notion in automobile luggage was severely limited by the Court in its landmark
opinion in United States v. Ross. The Ross Court attempted to clear-up the "troubled" automo-
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whether this standard also applied to automobile stops and subsequent
searches of automobile occupants and its contents. Since Terry, how-
ever, the Court has used a balancing analysis to erode slowly the im-
plicit probable cause standard for searches and seizures involving the
automobile.
Police authority to search suspects placed under a valid arrest is ab-
solute. 160 It was not until United States v. Robinson' 6t and Gustafson v.
Florida, 162 however, that the Court held that expansive searches of cus-
todial traffic violations arrestees could be conducted on less than prob-
able cause. 163  In Robinson the defendant was placed in custody for
driving with a revoked operator's permit. When he was frisked, the
officer found a crumpled cigarette package which contained heroin. In
Gustafson, the defendant was stopped for a moving violation and
placed into custody because he was unable to produce a driver's li-
cense. Although a limited Terry frisk revealed no suspicious objects,
the officer placed his hand in Gustafson's pocket, retrieved a cigarette
box, opened it, and found marijuana cigarettes. 64
bile exception area by holding that a widespread warrantless search of a car by police officers may
be conducted in the presence of probable cause. Id at 2168-2171. The Ross Court stated:
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been pre-
cisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a
home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in
the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of
the task at hand.
Id at 2157-58. In his Ross dissent, Justice Marshall sharply disagreed with the majority's holding
since its rationale subordinated traditional Fourth Amendment values and standards to efficient
law enforcement procedures. Id at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall reasoned that
"by equating a police officer's estimation of probable cause with a magistrate ... the majority not
only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement itself." Id at 2173 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Ross holding, there-
fore, adds to the importance of the probable cause requirement because once probable cause is
present, a full scale search of a vehicle and all of its comments may be commenced. See id at
2182, n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Inventory and car-care functions of police departments do not necessarily require a warrant.
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236
(1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
For holdings indicative of the lesser fourth amendment protections afforded automobiles, see
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). See generally Note, Fourth Amendment-Reasonable Expecta-
tions of Privacy in Automobile Searches, 70 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 498 (1979).
160. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233 n.3 (1973); Chimnel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969). See T. Taylor, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, 44-45 (1969).
The traditional rationale to justify this exception to the Warrant Clause is: 1) to protect the arrest-
ing officer from concealed weapons, and 2) to preserve criminal evidence that the arrestee may
destroy. See Note, Personal Search of Suspect Incident to Custodial Arrest is Per Se "Reasonable"
and Requires No Additional Justification, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1123, 1123 (1974).
161. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
162. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
163. Contra, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (probable cause for custodial arrest
required).
164. 414 U.S. at 262.
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Although the traditional reasons for conducting an extensive search
are not present in traffic-arrest situations, 65 the Robinson and Gustaf-
son Courts effectively held that in the absence of any dangerous cir-
cumstances, police officers would have an absolute right to conduct
extensive personal searches incident to custodial traffic arrests. The
Court in both cases discarded the Terry limited search doctrine by dis-
tinguishing an arrest from a stop; 66 it considered a prolonged custodial
arrest more dangerous than a brief stop and frisk situation.
More importantly, the absence of guidelines for determining when a
custodial arrest for traffic violations is warranted gives police officers
tremendous discretionary authority. The effect of this ad hoc approach
to traffic violators is that it permits an arresting officer to choose
whether or not he wishes to conduct a full-scale search of the subject.
Because there is nothing to prevent new police department regulations
from lumping seizures normally considered routine traffic stops into a
category which requires full custodial arrest, the potential for investiga-
tory abuse of Robinson and Gustafson is widespread. One commenta-
tor stated: "As Robinson allows an extensive search without probable
cause or warrant upon full custody arrest, it is not unlikely that the
custodial arrest option will be exercised on an officer's hunch that the
suspect might have something illegal in his possession." '67 Accord-
ingly, any alleged traffic violation potentially exposes the vehicle's op-
erator to a full blown investigatory search by the detaining officer,
regardless of the underlying circumstances.
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 168 the Court, through a balancing analy-
sis, extended Robinson-G ustafson to permit the search of a motorist
who had been detained for a traffic offense. In Mimms the respondent
was stopped by police officers for driving with an expired license
plate. '69 He was asked to step out of the car and show his license and
registration. The officer, noticing a bulge in Mimms' pocket, frisked
the respondent and discovered a revolver. 1 0 In its analysis, the Mimms
Court refused to focus on the seizure of the vehicle or the defendant's
subsequent patdown.'7 ' Instead, the Court applied a Terry-Brignoni-
165. See supra note 41. See also Robinson v. United States, 414 U.S. 218, 252-55 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (need to conduct a weapons search for traffic arrests is low relative to intrusion on
individual privacy).
166. Id at 235.
167. Antoun, United States Y. Robinson: Chipping Away at the Fourth Amendment, 1 OfIo N.
U.L. REV. 334, 337 (1974).
168. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
169. Id at 107.
170. Id. The Court stated that the "respondent alighted, whereupon the officer noted a large
bulge under respondent's sports jacket." Id
171. Id at 109. "This intrusion must ... focus ... on the incremental intrusion resulting
from the request to get out of the car once the vehicle is stopped." Id
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Ponce balancing analysis limited only to the reasonableness of the of-
ficer's order that the respondent exit the car. ' 72 It concluded the proce-
dure requiring traffic violators to get out of the car was a minimal
intrusion on individual freedom, relative to the safety interests of the
officer.' 73 Although the state admitted that there was nothing suspi-
cious or unusual about the driver and no apparent danger to the officer,
the Court, citing Terry dicta stated: "certainly it would be unreasona-
ble to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the perform-
ance of their duties."'' 7
4
The Mimms Court, by distinguishing the procedure of leaving the
car from the subsequent search, 175 not only circumvented the Terry re-
quirement of articulable dangerous circumstances in order to justify the
search, but its holding triggered a further dilution of the probable cause
standard by the lower courts. 17 6 Once a citizen is out of the car, then
the reasonable suspicion standard is applicable to invoke a search.
17 7
Accordingly, the bulge in the pocket, under the suspicion test, permit-
ted the officer to conduct a Terry patdown. 71
In Mimms, the majority bypassed the narrow holding of Terry and
effectively extended the reasonable suspicion test to automobile
"seizures" in situations where there is no articulable danger to the of-
ficer and no crime about to be committed. The Mimms balancing test
holding creates a lower privacy standard for traffic offenders, thus dis-
solving their fourth amendment protections. 79 By forcing a traffic of-
fender out of his car, he is exposed to wider and closer law enforcement
scrutiny. Once removed from the constitutionally protected environ-
ment of the automobile, the detainee is subject to a full-scale search on
reasonable suspicion grounds.' 80
172. Id
173. Id at 109-111.
174. Id at 110 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. I, 23 (1968)). The officer in Mimms acknowl-
edged that the only reason he asked the defendant to get out of his car was because it was standard
procedure. Id at 109-110.
175. Id at I11.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1979) (driver's reaching
toward pocket permitted subsequent probe of pocket); United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 498
(3d Cir. 1979) (totality of circumstances justify patdown of defendant); United States v. Rainone,
586 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1978) (search of occupants of suspicious-looking vehicle); United States v.
Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978).
177. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 112.
178. Terry required that dangerous circumstances must justify the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 28-
30.
179. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held that there exists a legitimate
expectation of privacy. See note 55 supra for discussion of Katz. Cf. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364 (1968) (expectation of privacy at place of work).
180. But see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The Warden Court said that the scope
of the search and seizure must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances initiating it. In
Warden, the Court held that a warrantless entry into the defendant's house was permissible be-
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The Court further extended its Mimms holding in Delaware v.
Prouse' 8 by noting that an automobile may be detained on less than
probable cause. Because the detaining officer had no articulable reason
for stopping the defendant, however, the Court held that the car's
seizure did not fall within the "reasonable suspicion" exception to
probable cause." 2 In Prouse, a police cruiser randomly stopped the
respondent's vehicle to check documents without observing any traffic
violations or suspicious activity, and seized marijuana in "plain view"
on the car floor.'8 3 In affirming the Delaware Supreme Court's sup-
pression of the marijuana, the Court noted that the vehicle stop was a
fourth amendment "seizure." In again employing its balancing test, the
Court cited Brignoni-Ponce, Martinez-Fuerte, and Terry for gui-
dance. '84 Although the Court noted that the state had a vital safety and
regulatory interest in its roads, it refused to extend the Martinez-Fuerte
no articulable suspicion standard to motor vehicles traveling on road-
ways away from the border. 85 It also refused to apply the traditional
probable cause standard to car seizures and instead adopted a Terry-
Brignoni-Ponce test. The Court stated:
We hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articul-
able and reasonable suspicion [of illegal conduct], stopping an automo-
bile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and
the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. ' 86
Although the majority noted that vehicle spot checks, such as at
roadblocks and other inspection checkpoints are permissible, the
seizure of an automobile is now judged on a reasonable suspicion
standard. I 87
Mimms and Prouse signify the beginning of the end of fourth
amendment probable cause protection for the automobile and its occu-
cause "the exigencies of the situation made that course [of action necessary]... Speed here was
essential." Id at 298-99.
181. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
182. See quote accompanying text at note 185 infra.
183. 440 U.S. at 650. The patrolman also "was not acting pursuant to any standards, guide-
lines, or procedures .. " Id The random stop was routine procedure. The marijuana was in
"plain view" and contraband in "plain view" may always be seized without a warrant. See Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 (1974) (scraping car paint off bumper is permissible plain view
seizure); Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (chim-
ney in plain view); Cady v. Dombrowski, 433 U.S. 413, 449 (1973) (plain view seizure of bloodied
sock and floor mat).
184. Id at 653. Accord United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
185. 440 U.S. at 656-57. For a discussion of the Mardnez-Fuerte holding, see notes 147-157
supra and accompanying text.
186. 440 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added).
187. Id See also id at 663 n.26. The Court stated: "Nor does our holding today cast doubt
on the permissibility of roadside truck weight-stations and inspection checkpoints ....
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pants. With both reasonable suspicion to detain a vehicle as well as to
search its occupants, law enforcement officials now have tremendous
authority to make widesweeping investigatory searches for contraband
that may be unrelated to the enforcement of traffic laws. 8 8 Once seized
on suspicion grounds, the vehicle and its occupants come under plain
view scrutiny. The minor intrusion which forms the basis for a reason-
able suspicion stop can now legitimately expand into a full blown in-
vestigatory search of the vehicle's occupants which, in turn, may lead to
a probable cause search of the vehicle's interior. 89 Thus, by extending
the Terry doctrine to permit vehicular stops on less than probable
cause, the Court also has eroded probable cause protections to all sub-
sequent and intervening events after the initial stop. The detainee may
be ordered out of his car and subjected to a Terry frisk, which if fruitful
for the officer, may result in an extended vehicular search. 9 0 Accord-
ingly, in automobile search and seizure situations, the reasonable suspi-
cion standard will eventually replace the probable cause
requirement. 191
VII. THE LATEST EROSION: THE AIRPORT DRUG COURIER
PROFILE PROGRAM
Large metropolitan airports have been identified by the Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) as major drug transportation cen-
ters. 92 In an attempt to disrupt the large flow of narcotics, the DEA
has assigned a number of highly skilled agents to selected airports as
188. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2181-82 (1982), discussed supra note 158,
where Justice Marshall noted that courts "rarely disturb" decisions by police officers who claim
they had probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband. He stated that when "police open a
container within a car and find contraband, they may acquire probable cause to believe that other
portions of the car ... contain contraband. In practice [this] . . .amount[s] to a wholesale au-
thorization for police to search any car from top to bottom when they have suspicion, whether
localized or general, that it contains contraband. Id at 2182, n. 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982) where the panel noted that "pulling an
automobile over to the side of the road constitute[s] a seizure that [is] impermissible without rea-
sonable suspicion." Id at 592.
189. Passengers in the car may not even have standing to challenge any subsequent search.
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261-62 (1960).
190. Probable cause still remains the standard for vehicular searches, unless they are for custo-
dial or inventory purposes, contraband is in plain view, or exigent circumstances exist. See Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (custodial warrantless
search of a car is permissible); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exigent circumstances).
For a listing of plain view cases, see note 183 supra.
191. But see note 190 supra. Probable cause still is required to search an automobile.
192. EDISON, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN AIRPORT INTER-
CEPTIONS OF DOMESTIC DRUG COURIERS, 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DEA LEGAL PROBLEMS].
This book, written by the legal coordinator of the DEA Airport Program, serves as an instruc-
tional manual for DEA field agents. It is a guide to making successful airport seizures which will
lead to subsequent prosecutions.
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part of a nationwide program to intercept illicit narcotics being trans-
ported by drug couriers. 193  Many drug courier arrests emanate from
investigations' 94 and informants' tips,' 95 but the majority of arrests
stem from the use of a drug courier profile developed by the DEA for
identifying possible drug smugglers. 196 The profile is an informally
compiled abstract of characteristics thought to be "typical" of persons
carrying illicit narcotics. 197  The courier profile is utilized by closely
observing departing and arriving passengers. If a passenger portrays
one or more of the profile characteristics, an agent will then observe the
individual and follow him through the airport concourse.' 98  If the
"suspect" exhibits sufficient characteristics, he will be stopped by the
agent, who will identify himself, ask the person if he is transporting any
drugs, and if he will consent to a search. 99 The critical determinations
in these cases is whether there has been "reasonable suspicion" to war-
rant a Terry stop and, if a fourth amendment "seizure" of the individ-
ual has taken place.
193. Id, Fact Sheet 1 (August 14, 1978). For a description of the program, see United States
v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (1979). Drug couriers
or "mules" are persons specifically employed to transport large amounts of drugs to supply local
wholesalers and dealers. Couriers commute from city to city using commercial air transportation,
either carrying the narcotics on their persons or in their luggage.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), ad on
other grounds, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of this case, see notes 209-215
infra and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1979). See notes 106-127
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutionality of informants' tips.
196. See DEA LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note 191.
197. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547, n. I. The profile was compiled from
interviews with cooperating defendants and informers as well as the DEA agents' personal experi-
ence in airport arrests. Kadish, Drug Courier Characteristics.- .4 Defense Profile, 15 TRIAL May
1979, at 47, 48. The 7 primary characteristics of a drug courier profile include:
1) arrival from or departure to an identified drug source city;
2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quantities of empty suitcases;
3) unusual itinerary, such as a rapid turnaround time for a very lengthy airplane trip;
4) use of an alias;
5) carrying unusually large amounts of currency, usually on their person, in briefcases or
bags;
6) purchasing airline tickets with a large amount of small denomination currency;
7) unusual nervousness beyond that normally exhibited by passengers.
Secondary characteristics include:
1) exclusive use of public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the
airport;
2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning;
3) leaving a false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline . . .
4) excessively frequent travel to source or distribution cities;
5) being a minority, particularly Black or Hispanic.
United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979). See also, United States v. Ballard, 573
F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978), for a discussion of a drug courier profile.
198. See, e.g., United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 536-539 (E.D. Mich. 1976), affd
on other grounds, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of this case, see notes 209-
215 infra, and accompanying text.
199. E.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Airport profile stops are the most recent-and perhaps most tenu-
ous-use of the reasonable suspicion test. Nonetheless, the constitu-
tionality of stopping suspects on the basis of a subjectively derived drug
courier profile has been analyzed within the limits of Terry, as ex-
tended by Adams, Brignoni-Ponce, and more recently, Mimms and
Prouse. The Brignoni-Ponce Court laid the basis for application of the
Terry test to airport profile stops by noting that certain physical charac-
teristics might be considered by law enforcement officials to determine
whether reasonable suspicion exists.2° Moreover, essentially the same
kinds of policy decisions which influenced the Brignoni-Ponce majority
to extend Terry to investigative stops are present in the drug courier
profile situations. 20 1 Despite a legal basis for extending the reasonable
suspicion standard to the airport stops under the drug courier profile,
there is a marked division in the federal courts as to when reasonable
suspicion is present as well as when a "seizure" has occurred.2 °2
The Second Circuit has upheld the validity of investigative stops ini-
tiated from characteristics consonant with the drug courier profile
solely on reasonable suspicion grounds.20 3 In United States v. Rico,"°
the defendant and his two companions were stopped in a New York
airport on the basis of the profile.205 The court held that the initial stop
was constitutional partly because the appellants' characteristics fit the
profile.2' It stated that the profile alerted the DEA agent to initiate the
surveillance and the stop was reasonable under an adapted version of
the Terry test.20 7 The Rico court held that the stop was permissible, not
200. 422 U.S. at 884-85.
201. See generally H. LEVINE, LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1974). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court was concerned with the magnitude of the illegal alien prob-
lem and considered the government interest in combatting this situation important. 422 U.S. at
873. See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900-15 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
202. Compare United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed infra at notes 204-
208 and accompanying text, and United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979) (sufficient
cause to justify a stop), with United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977) (profile alone
insufficient to justify an investigatory stop), and United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.
1979) (insufficient cause to justify a stop, but defendant's subsequent voluntary consent to search
of luggage permissible). Much of the drug courier litigation has emanated from the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits because Detroit and Atlanta, with airports serving as connecting hubs, are the two
major sites of the drug courier profile program. See Kadish, supra note 196, at 49.
See generally, Constantino, Cannavo and Goldstein, Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops.- Is
the Sky the Limit? 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 175 (1980).
203. E.g., United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d
494 (2d Cir. 1979).
204. 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979).
205. The defendants, who were Hispanics, appeared nervous, were constantly looking around
the terminal, walked "oddly," and did not openly associate on their way to the baggage claim
area. Id at 321-23.
206. Id at 326.
207. Id at 326-27. The court articulated the following test: Would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the search or seizure make an experienced and cautious officer suspicious
that the travellers were transporting narcotics.
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solely upon the basis of the courier profile, but because the "conduct
the agent observed and described would have made an experienced and
reasonably cautious law enforcement officer suspicious that the three
travellers were transporting narcotics. 208
The fifth and sixth circuits, however, have not deferred to the drug
courier profile and have required that some additional factual informa-
tion be present to create the requisite reasonable suspicion.2" In
United States v. Lewis,21 ° for example, DEA agents became suspicious
of the defendant after an airline ticket agent told them that Lewis had
exhibited profile characteristics. A quick investigation found that
Lewis was making a quick return, was using an alias, and had been
previously arrested for heroin possession. An interrogation and subse-
quent search revealed that Lewis was carrying heroin. 2II The trial court
noted that the "drug courier profile" in and of itself could not supply
the necessary suspicion to permit an investigative stop under Terry.
212
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the drug courier profile could
be used as a valid investigative and law enforcement tool,21 3 but re-
quired a showing of reasonable suspicion based on the profile plus
some additional factual justification to initiate a Terry stop.2 14 Because
the DEA agent had gone beyond the scope of the profile by checking
the defendant's background, the necessary additional objective facts
were present to create a reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop.21 5
The sixth circuit's Lewis rationale that the profile alone is insuffi-
cient to justify a reasonable suspicion search, and that additional objec-
tive information is needed also has been followed in the fifth
circuit.2" 6 In United States v. Ballard,2 17 the fifth circuit reversed the
defendant's conviction on the grounds that DEA agents had stopped
Ballard on only two profile characteristics and without any other
outside objective facts.2 8 The court rejected the Government's conten-
208. Id
209. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lewis, 556
F.2d 385, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977).
210. 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977).
211. Id at 386-87. See United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), a fd
on other grounds, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977) for a detailed narrative of the facts.
212. Id at 389. The court stated: "the 'drug courier profile' could not even provide the
founded suspicion to justify an investigative stop under Terry ....
213. Id at 389-90.
214. Id at 389.
215. Id The court noted the DEA agent knew that the defendant was using an alias, had
taken a very short round trip to a distant city, had a prior arrest for possession of heroin, and had
used a virtually empty suitcase.
216. United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); see United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d
979 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1979).
217. 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
218. Id at 914. The Government was informed by an anonymous tip that a man fitting the
defendant's description would be arriving that night from Los Angeles. When he deplaned, the
243
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tion that the objective facts were furnished by an uncorroborated tip,
noting that "the elements of the courier profile that were present in this
case . . . do not in any significant way operate to distinguish Ballard
from the general public." 219
Although reasonable suspicion is now accepted as the established
standard in airports, 220 what exactly is necessary to permit an investi-
gatory Terry stop is quite unclear from the circuit court case law.221
Some circuits rely totally on the drug profile to furnish less than prob-
able cause suspicion, while others require specific objective facts, in-
dependent of the profile, to justify a stop.222 The trend in recent cases,
however, is that fewer objective facts are necessary to link a suspect to
drug smuggling. Consequently, there is increasing judicial deference to
the DEA, an administrative agency which has an obvious institutional
bias toward airport stops. 223
In United States v. Mendenhall,224 although given the opportunity,
the Supreme Court refused to clarify some of the issues in the drug
courier profile program. In Mendenhall, DEA agents stopped the de-
fendant for questioning because she exhibited several profile character-
istics. 225 Although no additional objective information was available to
the officers prior to the stop, subsequent questioning revealed that the
name on her driver's license differed from that on her airplane ticket.226
Mendenhall then accompanied the DEA agents to a special interroga-
DEA agent observed that the defendant appeared to be very nervous and that he was carrying no
luggage.
219. [d at 916.
220. See United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 324-26 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The standard of reasona-
bleness remains that of Terry"); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 915 (5th Cir. 1978) (the
required reasonable suspicion must be more than a hunch); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,
56-63 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Garcia, 450 F. Supp. 1020, 1023-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); United
States v. Taibe, 446 F. Supp. 1142, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
221. Compare United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), and United States v. Chat-
man, 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977), and United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1976), cert
denied 429 U.S. 1066 (1977) with United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980), and
United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). Although the former group of cases
presented to the court an array of specific facts, the latter do little more than recite typical charac-
teristics of the drug profile.
222. See latter cases cited in note 220 supra.
223. See United States v. Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834 (11 th Cir. 1982), where the court believed a
DEA agent who claimed that he had the same sense of smell as a dog which is specially trained to
detect hidden drugs. The panel stated: "We now learn that among (Agent) Markonni's many
talents is an olfactory sense we in the past attributed only to canines." Id at 835. See also Con-
stantino, supra note 202, at 188. Judicial deference to subjective DEA profile characteristics is,
however, not without critics. See United States v. Klein, 592 F.2d 909, 911-912, n.3 (5th Cir.
1979).
224. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
225. The defendant arrived in Detroit from Los Angeles, which is considered a "source city."
She appeared nervous, constantly scanned the airport, and claimed no luggage. 446 U.S. at 547
n. 1.
226. Id at 547-548.
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tion room where she eventually "consented" to a body search which
revealed she was carrying heroin.
227
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of ap-
peals and held that there was no violation of the respondent's fourth
amendment rights. The Mendenhall Court, however, vigorously dis-
agreed on the reasonableness of the initial investigatory stop. Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court, first looked at whether the defendant
had been seized when initially approached by the DEA agents 228 by
examining the record of the Mendenhall case.2 29 Citing Sibron, the
plurality first stated that not every encounter between a citizen and a
police officer is a seizure.23° It then articulated the following test to
determine whether Mendenhall was seized by the DEA agents: "[I]n
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave. ' 231 In hold-
ing that Mendenhall was not seized by the DEA agents who detained
the respondent,232 the plurality noted that 1) the stop had occurred in a
public area; 2) the agents were in plain clothes and displayed no weap-
ons; 3) the agents did not summon the defendant but approached her;
4) the respondent was requested, not ordered, to produce
identification.2 33
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell did not address the seizure
issue and instead assumed that a seizure had occurred when the agents
approached the respondent.234 The concurrence then invoked a bal-
ancing test to determine whether the investigatory stop was reasonable.
Citing Terry, Brignoni-Ponce, and Prouse, the concurrence looked at
the public interest in the stop, the nature and scope of the intrusion,
227. Id at 548-549. Mendenhall was asked to submit to a strip search and was told she could
refuse. When asked to remove her clothes, she protested. She then was advised that if she wasn't
carrying drugs, there would be no problem. Whereupon, Mendenhall disrobed and the heroin
was found in her undergarments. Id For a discussion of the consent issue in this case, see infra
notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
228. 446 U.S. at 551. Only Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart on the issue of whether a
seizure took place. Id at 546.
229. This was an unusual approach because neither the district court nor the court of appeals
heard arguments on the seizure issue. 446 U.S. at 569, n.2 (White, J., dissenting). Instead, the
lower courts focused on whether the seizure was a reasonable Terry stop. Justice Stewart, how-
ever, stated that the seizure question was raised because the lower courts' ruling rested on a "seri-
ous misapprehension of federal constitutional law." Id at 55 1, n.5.
230. Id at 553 citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Justice Stewart noted "not
every encounter . . . is an intrusion requiring an objective justification."
231. Id at 554. The Court also stated that the subjective intention of the officer to detain
Mendenhall, had she attempted to leave, was irrelevant. Id at n.6.
232. Id at 555.
233. Id. The Court did not consider whether Mendenhall was physically touched by the
agents or whether the claim by the agents that they were narcotics officers was a sufficient demon-
stration of authority, thus invoking the defendant's fourth amendment protections. See id at 552.
234. Id at 560 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Powell was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.
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and the objective factors upon which a law entorcement official relies
in light of his knowledge and experience.235 Justice Powell noted that
the public interest in "detecting those who traffic in deadly drugs" is
"compelling," in comparison with the "modest" intrusion of the
stop. 236 Furthermore, he concluded that in light of the agents' experi-
ence, there was sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the
defendant. 237 Accordingly, the concurrence expanded on the parame-
ters of Terry to justify the stop through a balancing analysis.
Furthermore, a majority of the Court held that the respondent's
fourth amendment protections were not violated when she went from
the airport concourse, where she originally was detained, to the DEA
office, where she later consented to a search.238 The Court concluded
that Mendenhall accompanied the agents to the office "voluntarily in a
spirit of apparent cooperation" and, therefore, "it cannot be contended
that her apparent consent to the subsequent search was infected by an
unlawful detention. ' 239 More importantly, the Court also found that
despite the respondent's lack of education, she knowingly had con-
sented to the search which led to the discovery of the heroin. 240 Ac-
cordingly, the Court found the entire procedure leading up to the
discovery of the illegal drugs reasonable under the fourth amendment.
In Reid v. Georgia,24l the Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed
the issue of whether the drug courier profile alone could furnish rea-
sonable suspicion to permit a stop. In Reid, the defendant was stopped
by DEA agents based solely on profile characteristics and without any
objective facts.24 2 The Court, citing Terry, noted that to detain a sus-
235. Id at 561 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
236. Id at 561-563 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
237. Id at 563-64 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). The concurrence said
that it would use an objective police officer standard in determining whether there is enough
information to justify a stop on reasonable suspicion. Justice Powell stated: "In reviewing the
factors that led the agents to stop and question the respondent, it is important to recall that a
trained law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct
which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer." Id at 563 quoting Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
238. Id at 557.
239. Id Consent to a search is always constitutionally valid. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Katz v. United States 389 U.S.
347, 358 (1967). The consent must be voluntarily given, uncoerced, and with the understanding
that it could be freely and effectively withheld. The question of whether consent is voluntarily
given is to be determined by the "totality of the circumstances." See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. The Government has the
burden of proving that the consent was not the product of express or implied duress or coercion.
See id at 222; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
240. 446 U.S. at 558. The Court noted that Mendenhall twice was told she could decline to
consent to the search. Id
241. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).
242. Id at 439. The defendant was stopped on the basis of four profile criteria:
I) he arrived from Fort Lauderdale, a source city for drugs;
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pect without probable cause, the DEA agent must have an articulable
suspicion that the person is engaging in criminal activity.243 Corre-
spondingly, the Court held that because the DEA profile on Reid could
not point to any objective justifications for suspecting criminal activity,
it found no reasonable suspicion to stop him.244 The Court stated that
the characteristics relied on "describe a very large category of presuma-
bly innocent travellers, who would be subject to virtually random
seizures. "245 Although the Court appeared to have adopted the Fifth
Circuit view that additional objective information beyond the profile is
needed to justify a stop,2" it did not pass on the per se validity of the
profile.2 47  Rather, it concluded that the defendant's activity was not
enough to justify a seizure based upon reasonable suspicion.
The Mendenhall and Reid holdings indicate that a majority of the
Court is willing to expand the reasonable suspicion to widespread in-
vestigatory stops far beyond the parameters of Terry. Although these
holdings did little to clarify the general confusion in the circuit courts
on the drug courier profile program,248 the Court implied that the pro-
2) he arrived early in the morning, when law enforcement activity is low;
3) the defendant and his companion appeared to be trying to conceal the fact that they were
traveling together,
4) he had no luggage other than a shoulder bag.
Id at 441.
243. Id The Court stated that the agent's suspicion was no more than an "inchoate and un-
particularized suspicion or 'hunch' that was too slender to support the seizure in this case." Id
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
244. 448 U.S. at 441.
245. Id
246. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit view, see notes 209-219 supra and accompanying
text.
247. Although the Mendenhall Court did not discuss this issue, the concurrence found that the
DEA agents had enough information from the profile to stop the defendant. See 446 U.S. 544,
560 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
248. The different views articulated by the Justices in Mendenhall reiterated the competing
rationales previously expressed by the second, fifth, and sixth circuits. The Justices, moreover,
could not even agree on whether a seizure had taken place. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 670
F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982), where the fifth circuit, sitting en banc, stated: "The fractured legal
conclusions of the majority in Mendenhall leave us without guidance in deciding whether an ini-
tial airport stop such as that in this case constitutes a seizure. Id at 592. In Berry, a DEA agent
initiated a stop of the defendant outside of the airport terminal based upon the profile characteris-
tic of nervousness and a "vague. . .awarelness] of having seen a photograph of" the appellant.
Id. at 588. In affirming his conviction the fifth circuit, in an exhaustive opinion, tried to estab-
fish some rules from the "confusing thicket of" caselaw in this area. Id at 593. The Berry panel
first held that initial airport stops based on the profile if extremely restricted in scope and con-
ducted in a noncoercive manner, do not invoke fourth amendment protections. Id at 594. The
court then considered the role of the drug courier profile, which it noted was nothing more than an
administrative tool of the police. Id at 600 and n.2 1. In finding reasonable suspicion to justify a
stop, the panel held that it would assign no characteristic greater or less weight merely because the
characteristic is present on, or absent from the profile. Id at 601. Lastly, the court decided that
probable cause--and not reasonable suspicion-was necessary, absent consent by the defendant,
to detain further a suspect who initially had been stopped in a limited interrogation. Id at 602.
Thus, according to the fifth circuit, reasonable suspicion may justify an initial stop and interroga-
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file could be used as a general basis to justify a stop on less than prob-
able cause. More importantly, by tacitly approving of the drug courier
profile program in Mendenhall, the Court has greatly expanded the
Terry exception to permit very aggressive police activities on the weak
basis of a subjective profile that purportedly distinguishes the guilty
from the innocent. Thus, Mendenhall and Reid signal a further erosion
of Terry's absolute requirement that the presence of several specific and
objective facts are needed to justify a stop on reasonable suspicion
grounds.249 Instead, a computer profile, using general physical charac-
teristics and behavioral traits, linked with a few, if any, objective fac-
tors now form the basis for a Terry stop. Furthermore, the fact remains
that the DEA program subjects everyone observed by the agent to some
form of surveillance-and possibly to an investigatory stop as well as a
subsequent search. Because the DEA program essentially encourages
agents to initiate as many encounters as possible, 5 ° the abusive poten-
tial of this program is unusually great.25' Hence, the narrow exception
to the probable cause standard announced in Terry now has evolved to
permit widescale governmental scrutiny and intrusion of anyone who
enters an airport. More importantly, the ramifications of Mendenhall
and Reid extend far beyond the terminal as long as investigatory stops
on less than probable cause are characterized as "modest" intrusions
upon personal privacy.252
VIII. CONCLUSION
The post-Terry caselaw indicates that the once absolute probable
cause requirement to justify searches and seizures has undergone a
tion, but it will not be extended to permit further investigatory questioning which requires the
suspect to leave the public areas of the airport.
249. The Court noted that something more than the four very general profile characteristics
used by the agents in Reid to justify the stop would be necessary to justify further seizures. How-
ever, the Reid Court did not specifically mention what other types of objective information should
be present to justify a Terry stop.
250. The more encounters initiated by agents, the more chances there are of discovering
contraband.
251. The Mendenhall-Reid standard allows police to ask intrusive questions of any unwary or
unknowledgeable citizen based on a subjective suspicion. It is, therefore, unrealistic to believe
that the average individual, who is unaware of most of his constitutional rights when confronted
by someone with governmental authority, will simply feel free to ignore the official and walk
away. In Mendenhall, the Court's belief that the defendant should have known she was free to
walk away as well as to refuse consent to the body search is theoretically justifiable, but in reality,
clearly erroneous. But ef. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1982), discussed at note
247, supra, where the court observed the following: "We think it strikingly unusual that so many
individuals stopped at airports consent to search while carrying drugs and even show where they
have hidden drugs." Id at 598, n.16. See also United States v. Seltzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980).
252. But see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (custodial arrest on less than prob-
able cause unreasonable).
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rapid process of erosion.253 Because the reasonable suspicion exception
created by Terry requires a lower quantum of proof than traditional
probable cause, fourth amendment protections are seriously diluted
whenever the suspicion standard is used.254 The narrow holding of
Terry, which was to be limited to very dangerous criminal situations,
reflects the Terry Court's original reluctance to make an exception to
the probable cause requirement. However, the fear expressed by Jus-
tice Douglas, Terry's lone dissenter, that this holding would mark the
beginning of a general erosion of the probable cause standard, clearly
has been borne out by subsequent decisions.255 The several require-
ments articulated in Terry for a fourth amendment intrusion on less
than probable cause have been relaxed, thereby permitting an expan-
sion of the Terry exception to other areas.
An inherent danger in this expansionary trend is an eventual under-
mining of the historical imperatives upon which the fourth amendment
was built. The importance of preserving the traditional probable cause
requirement was well-stated in the passage below by Justice Brennan,
who dissented strongly from the Martinez-Fuerte holding:
The cornerstone of this society, indeed of any free society, is orderly
procedure. The Constitution, as originally adopted, was therefore, in
great measure, a procedural document. For the same reasons the draft-
ers of the Bill of Rights largely placed their faith in procedural limita-
tions on government action. The Fourth Amendment's requirement
that searches and seizures be reasonable enforces this fundamental un-
derstanding in erecting its buffer against the arbitrary treatment by citi-
zens by government. But to permit . . . police discretion to supplant
the objectivity of reason and, thereby, expediency to reign in the place
of order, is to undermine Fourth Amendment safeguards and threaten
erosion of the cornerstone of our system of a government, for, as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter reminded us, 'the history of American freedom is in
no small measure, the history of procedure.' 256
The post-Terry cases, however, have been slowly dismantling the pow-
erful buffer that the fourth amendment creates between potentially
abusive police authority and the unwary individual. Moreover, this
erosion has been accomplished by expanding the parameters estab-
lished by Terry for a stop based on a reasonable suspicion.
Adams and other lower courts have held that reasonable suspicion
will justify a stop and frisk, although the police officer cannot point to
the Terry requirement of specific objective and articulable personal ob-
253. For a discussion of traditional probable cause, see notes 12-62 supra and accompanying
text.
254. United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
255. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 888 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
256. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 578 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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servations that a crime is about to occur. This dilution ot probable
cause not only permits arbitrary police conduct but encourages police
to go fishing for contraband.257 Under Terry, a frisk justified on less
than probable cause is supposed to be extremely limited in scope and
does not permit close scrutiny of a suspect's person. In reality, how-
ever, this limitation has been, and perhaps always will be, impossible to
administer. A court will inevitably defer to an officer's opinion that he
was making a "thorough" limited search or that he felt or saw some-
thing suspicious which, in turn, can justify a further intrusion into the
suspect's pocket.
Furthermore, the border and automobile cases expand a Terry stop
to situations where there clearly is no danger to police or persons in the
vicinity, thus permitting the suspicion test to become a powerful "legal
construct for the regulation of a general investigatory police power. "258
With the diminution of the Terry requirement that specific objective
facts be prerequisite to searches and seizures on less than probable
cause, the investigative utility of the reasonable suspicion test has
greatly enhanced the power of police to intrude upon the individual;
civil liberties, conversely, have become weakened. As Justice Douglas
once said: "police power exercised without probable cause is arbi-
trary. . . .To say that the police may accost citizens at their whim and
may detain them upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in reality, that the
police may accost and detain citizens at their whim.'"259
Airports are the latest area of erosion for the probable cause stan-
dard. In airports, the Terry exception is stretched beyond its original
parameters to permit almost random coercive stops of individuals sus-
pected of being drug smugglers. 26 The clear absence of objective stan-
dards in the courier profile indicts almost anyone of a nonconformist
appearance or attitude and, perhaps, a large majority of the general
population at one time or another.
The primary vehicle for the Supreme Court's erosion of the probable
cause standard in these cases has been the balancing test, which was
announced in Camara and employed by Terry and its progeny.
Through balancing, a determination of reasonableness is reached by
comparing the need for a stop against the gravity of the intrusion. The
major flaw with the balancing test is that it is inconsistent with the ma-
jor objectives and traditional bases of the fourth amendment, which
was designed to shield the individual against all unreasonable govern-
257. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
258. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 889 (Douglas, J., concurring).
259. Id (Douglas, J., concurring).
260. One commentator has suggested that the absence of objective standards in the drug cou-
rier cases indicates that Terry is now inapplicable. Constantino, supra note 201, at 187.
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mental intrusions. The fourth amendment protects individuals,
whereas the balancing test apparently always favors society, primarily
because societal intrusions are usually limited in nature or always la-
beled as such. This favoritism also occurs because governmental power
and interests historically expand; when compared directly to the pri-
vacy interests of an individual, society inevitably wins. Thus, the in-
herent bias of the balancing test is to dilute the probable cause
standard, thereby threatening to replace it with reasonable suspicion.
Accordingly, the balancing test should only be used in those rare situa-
tions where there is a threat of irreversible physical danger to society
which would require unfettered and immediate police action.
In contrast, however, when government intrusion is clearly necessary
and societal interests paramount, the Court should avoid using a bal-
ancing test. Instead, it prudently should designate certain zones where
traditional fourth amendment protections are inapplicable. Presently,
such an area is the national border where searches and seizures may
take place without probable cause.26" ' By designating other such zones,
e.g., national airports, public areas of apartment houses, kitchens of
public restaurants,262 the Court will no longer create more and more
exceptions to the probable cause standard. The inevitable result of this
dangerous process is the exception swallowing the rule. Since "The
Rule" in this case is an explicit constitutional standard, its foundation
must be reinforced and the policies behind its enactment preserved.
"The Rule," furthermore, clearly is threatened because the reason-
able suspicion standard is being adopted more and more by the courts
when there is a clear lack of probable cause to sustain a search and/or
seizure. The standard has gone from allowing only purely defensive
procedures to now permitting aggressive criminal detection and law en-
forcement techniques. The dilution of probable cause is, perhaps, due
to the tremendous pressures being placed on the courts and law en-
forcement officials to reduce the large amount of undetected an unpros-
ecuted crime present in American society. In the illegal narcotics field,
for example, this is exacerbated by the fact that a relatively small per-
centage of individuals involved in drug-related activities are ever
caught. Consequently, the traditional probable cause standard of the
fourth amendment is being balanced away to aggressive, arbitrary, and
procedurally efficient police actions263 and the utility of the search and
261. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
262. See note 70 supra, for a discussion of administrative searches.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), where the Court recently noted
that "when a legitimate (warrantless automobile) search is underway, . . . nice distinctions be-
tween . . . glove compartments, . . . trunks, and wrapped packages . . . must give way to the
interest in the prompt and efficient completion ofthe task at hand " Id at 2170-71 (emphasis added).
But see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
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seizure at hand is becoming more important than the traditional pro-
tections given to individuals by the fourth amendment. Therefore, the
Pandora's Box opened by Terry must be closed before the probable
cause standard is completely balanced away.
FREDERICK D. UNGER*
* Class of 1983, Emory University School of Law.
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